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PART III: PUBLIC LAW
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
by
Harvey Wingo*
I. LOCAL ELECTIONS

One-Man, One-Vote Strikes Home. The Texas Constitution provides that
all Texas counties must be divided into four commissioners precincts from
each of which shall be elected one county commissioner. The four commissioners thus elected by the qualified voters of their respective precincts,
together with a county judge elected on a county-wide basis, constitute the
county commissioners court, over which the county judge presides! This
five-member body exercises "such powers and jurisdiction over all county
business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State."'
The powers conferred upon these courts by the constitution include the
power to make the required divisions of the county into four precincts,
subject to the general standard that the divisions be made "from time to
time, for the convenience of the people."' In September 1962 suit was

brought by a resident property owner, taxpayer, and qualified voter of
the city of Midland to compel a redistricting of the commissioners precincts
in Midland County, Texas. The plaintiff contended that by including
the entire city of Midland within a single precinct, the Midland County

Commissioners Court had placed 97.80 per cent of the county's population in one precinct and had distributed the small remaining population
among the other three precincts, thus making the precincts "grossly
impractical and inconvenient to the people."" The trial court ruled in
favor of the plaintiff and ordered that the county be divided into precincts
so that each would have "substantially the same number of people."' On
appeal, a Texas court of civil appeals reversed without a remand, emphasizing that "the Texas Constitution . . . requires only that the division
of the county in such precincts be 'for the convenience of the people,' ,,
and that there exists no requirement for a division into precincts of substantially equal population. In reaching its conclusion, the court performed
the rather remarkable feat of avoiding altogether a discussion of the 1964
reapportionment decisions of the United States Supreme Court.'
* B.A., Birmingham-Southern College; M.A., LL.B., Vanderbilt University. Assistant Professor
of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1
TEx. CoNST. art. 5, § 18.
2 Id.
8 Id.
4
Midland County v. Avery, 397 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), rev'd, 406 S.W.2d
402 (Tex. 1966).
sId. at 921, quoting from the judgment of the trial court. (Emphasis added by the court of
civil appeals.)
I Id. at 922.
'See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The court referred to Davis, The Implications
of Baker v. Carr on the County Commissioners Court of Texas, 17 BAYLOR L. REV. 41
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The Supreme Court of Texas, in an outstanding opinion by Justice
Steakley,' took issue with both the trial court and the court of civil appeals.
Attacking the "one-man, one-vote" issue directly, the court stressed that
"the primary function of the commissioners court is the administration of
the business affairs of the county"' and that these affairs "disproportionately concern the rural areas.""0 For this reason, an analogy to the state
legislature or the federal Congress was considered unsound,1' and the
court concluded:
[T]he convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a county
may require-and constitutionally justify--a rational variance from equality
in population in commissioners precincts upon the basis of additional relevant
factors such as number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of
county roads and taxable values."

The case was remanded with directions for the trial court to enter a judgment requiring the Midland County Commissioners Court to redistrict
the county "within the constitutional boundaries" delineated by the Texas
Supreme Court."2
The United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment permitted "no substantial variation from
equal population in drawing districts for units of local government having
general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by
the body."' 4 To the contention that the functions of the commissioners

(1965), where the problem is discussed, and suggested that "it would be well for the reader of
this opinion to review [the Davis article] for additional background information on the case."
Midland County v. Avery, 397 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), rev'd, 406 S.W.2d 402
(Tex. 1966).
'Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1966), vacated, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
9 Id. at 426.
lid.
at 428.
[I]mportant affairs of the county administered by the commissioners court-such as
roads, bridges, taxable values of large land areas-disproportionately concern the rural
areas. Theoretically, the commissioners court is the governing body of the county
and the commissioners represent all the residents, both urban and rural, of the
county. But developments during the years have greatly narrowed the scope of the
functions of the commissioners court and limited its major responsibilities to the
nonurban areas of the county. It has come to pass that the city government with
its legislative, executive and judicial branches, is the major concern of the city
dwellers and the administration of the affairs of the county is the major concern
of the rural dwellers.
Id.
,I
"Its
[the commissioners court's] legislative functions
are negligible and county government
is not otherwise comparable to the legislature of a state or to the federal Congress where the
'one-man, one-vote' principle is asserted in its most exacting and compelling sense." Id. at 426.
1
1 id. at 428.
"Id. at 428-29. Justice Smith, dissenting, would have affirmed the judgment of the court of
civil appeals. Id. at 429. See Webster & FitzGerald, Municipal Corporations, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 221 (1967), for a discussion of the Texas Supreme Court opinion in

Avery.
(emphasis added). On the issue of
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968)
whether there was a final judgment, the Court stated:
The Texas Supreme Court determined that neither the State nor the Federal Constitution requires that population be the sole basis for apportioning the Midland
County Commissioners Court. There is therefore no independent state ground for the
refusal to award the relief requested by petitioner. And since the Supreme Court
opinion contemplated no further proceedings in the lower Texas courts, a 'final
judgment' that population does not govern the apportionment of the Commissioners
Court is before us.
Id. at 478 n.2.
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court are not sufficiently "legislative"" in nature to warrant application
of the one-man, one-vote principle, the Supreme Court countered that
the court, in common with most county governing bodies, exercises legislative, executive, and judicial functions and is the general governing body
for Midland County, Texas. Speaking for the majority, Justice White
rejected the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court that the affairs of the
commissioners court disproportionately concerned the rural areas.'" He
found more persuasive the fact that "the powers of the Commissioners
Court include the authority to make a substantial number of decisions
that affect all citizens, whether they reside inside or outside the city limits
of Midland,"'" including the maintenance of buildings, the administration
of welfare services, the determination of school districts, including those
within the city of Midland, and the imposition of taxes on all property
in the county.'8 Thus the simplistic"6 one-man, one-vote concept was
imposed upon thousands of local governmental units even if in the process
the essential though admittedly more difficult task of achieving an equitable and balanced scheme of representation was abandoned. It was this task
which Mr. Justice Fortas believed should be undertaken with regard to
local governmental units such as that involved here,"' and which Mr.
15See note II sepra. For a case in which the Supreme Court refused to require application of
the one-man, one-vote principle partially because of the administrative nature of the functions
exercised by the governmental body in question, see Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
Among the functions exercised by the Board of Education were the "preparation of an annual
budget and levy of taxes," and "the power to transfer areas from one school district to another."
Id. at 110 n.7, where a complete listing of the Board's functions may be found.
1oSee note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
"Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968).
18 Id.
"See, e.g., Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives: What is Fair Representation?, 51 A.B.A.J.
319, 320 (1965). Professor Dixon has been one of the most persuasive critics of the one-man,
one-vote concept. See Dixon, Reapportionment in the Suprene Court and Congress: Constitutional
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MsCH. L. REv. 209 (1964); Dixon, Apportionment Standards
and Judicial Power, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 367 (1963). See also 22 Sw. L.J. 542 (1968).
(Fortas, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice
"Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 495 (1968)
Fortas stated that he would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, since the Texas Supreme
Court had ordered a redistricting; thus it would be better for the United States Supreme Court
to "pass upon the final product of Texas' exercise of its governmental powers, in terms of our constitutional responsibility, and not upon a scheme which Texas herself has invalidated." Id. Justice
Fortas stressed his belief that "in the circumstances of this case equal protection of the laws may
be achieved-and perhaps can only be achieved-by a system which takes into account a complex
of values and factors, and not merely the arithmetic simplicity of one equals one." Id. at 496.
While agreeing that the one-man, one-vote rule is "appropriate to the selection of a State legislature," Justice Fortas concluded that "the same cannot be said of all local governmental units,
and certainly not of the unit involved in this case." Id. at 498. Relying upon grounds similar
to those that prompted the decision of the Texas Supreme Court, Justice Fortas carefully analyzed
the functions of the Midland County Commissioners Court. He noted the majority's emphasis on
the authority of the commissioners court to levy taxes upon all the residents of the county, but
responded:
True, the county's revenues come largely from the City of Midland. But the Commissioners Court fixes the tax rate subject to the specific limitations provided by the
legislature. . . . Taxes are assessed and collected not by it, but by an official elected
on a countywide basis. . . . We should not use tax impact as the sole or controlling
basis for vote distribution. It is merely one in a number of factors, including the
functional impact of the county government, which should be taken into account
in determining whether a particular voting arrangement results in reasonable recognition of the rights and interests of citizens. Certainly, neither tax impact nor the
relatively few services rendered within the City of Midland should compel the State
to vest practically all voting power in the city residents to the virtual denial of a
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Justice Stewart, also dissenting, 1 has consistently urged upon the Court
with regard to the apportionment of state legislatures as well." In a third
dissent," Mr. Justice Harlan reaffirmed his view "that these adventures of
the Court in the realm of political science are beyond its constitutional
powers, 24 and reasoned that the extension of the one-man, one-vote
standard to local government is "both unjustifiable and ill-advised."'
Elections at Large. The type of election at large which is perhaps most
frequently employed at the local level received official sanction by the
United States Supreme Court in Dusch v. Davis.2' The governing body
of Virginia Beach, Virginia, is composed of eleven council members from
seven boroughs. Four members are elected at large without regard to the
borough in which they reside; the other seven are also elected at large but
with the requirement that one reside in each of the seven boroughs. Upholding this plan, the Supreme Court said:
The 'Seven-Four Plan' is not an evasive scheme to avoid the consequences of
reapportionment or to perpetuate certain persons in office. The plan does not
preserve any controlling influence of the smaller boroughs, but does indicate
a desire for intelligent expression of views on subjects relating to agriculture
which remains a great economic factor in the welfare of the entire population....

The Seven-Four Plan seems to reflect a detente between urban and rural
communities that may be important in resolving the complex problems of the
modern megalopolis in relation to the city, the suburbia, and the rural
countryside. 7
The most significant fact in Dusch, however, was that the population of
the seven boroughs varied from 733 in the smallest to 29,048 in the
largest." Thus, although the election at large often prevented the rural
communities comprising the smaller boroughs from electing the reprevoice of those who are dependent on the county government for roads, welfare, and
other essential services.
Id. at 508. Justice Fortas concluded that although a redistricting of Midland County was required, as the Texas Supreme Court had ordered, "the Court's formula merely errs in the opposite
direction: Only the city population will be represented, and the rural areas will be eliminated from
a voice in the county government to which they must look for essential services." Id. at 509.
21 Id. at 509 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2""I continue to believe that . . . the apportionment of the legislative body of a sovereign
than the apportionment of a county government, is far too subtle and complicated
State, no less
a business to be resolved as a matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic." Id.
at 510. For the details of Justice Stewart's views, see Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713, 744 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
24Id. at 487.
2 Id. Commending Mr. Justice Fortas for his "admirable analysis," Justice Harlan took issue
with Fortas' proposed solution: "[I]t would bid fair to plunge this Court into an avalanche of
local reapportionment cases with no firmer constitutional anchors than its own notions of what
constitutes 'equal protection' in any given instance." Id. at 494. Justice Harlan concluded:
[T]he only sure-footed way of avoiding . . . the inequities inherent in today's
decision, and . . . the morass of pitfalls that would follow from my Brother Fortas'
approach, is for this Court to decline to extend the constitutional experiment of
Reynolds, and to leave the structuring of local governmental units to the political
process where it belongs.

Id.
U.S. 112 (1967).
2Id. at 116-17.
21Id. at 114.
26387
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sentative of their choice, the Supreme Court seemed to recognize the
desirability of assuring at least some representation from these areas."'
A case involving an election at large plan very similar to the one at
issue in Dusch arose in Dallas, Texas. ° At the time of the litigation, there
were on the Dallas City Council nine councilmen elected from six districts,al but in contrast to the Virginia Beach situation, each district in

Dallas was of substantially equal population. All members were elected
at large, but at least one member was required to reside in each of the six
districts, while the remaining three could reside anywhere within the city.
Goldblatt, a candidate for councilman from District C, was defeated by
a vote of 14,429 to 9,009, but he defeated his opponent in District C by
a vote of 2,192 to 1,287."* Goldblatt sought to enjoin the enforcement
of the charter provisions requiring elections at large, contending that this
plan violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution. Relying primarily upon the Supreme
Court opinion in Dusch, the federal district court upheld the plan, finding
that it met "the constitutional test under the Equal Protection Clause of
'invidious discrimination.' ""
II.

ANNEXATION

AND DISANNEXATION

Enactment of the Municipal Annexation Act 4 in 1963 has given rise
to a number of interesting cases. Four such cases arose during the survey
period and are discussed below.
Annexation. The Act provides "that the unincorporated area, not a part
of any other city, which is contiguous to the corporate limits of any city,
to the extent described herein [varying according to the population of

the city], shall comprise and be known as the extraterritorial jurisdiction"
of the city." Furthermore, with the exception of property owned by the
city, "[a] city may annex territory only within the confines of its extra"' The Supreme Court made it clear in Avery that the Dusch decision was left undisturbed:
The Sailors and Dusch cases demonstrate that the Constitution and this Court are
not roadblocks in the path of innovation, experiment, and development among units
of local government. . . . Our decision today is only that the Constitution imposes
one ground rule for the development of arrangements of local government: a requirement that units with general governmental powers over an entire geographic
area not be apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal
population.
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1968).
Iii Dusch the Court had clearly distinguished the use of districts--even districts of substantially unequal population-as the basis of residence for candidates: "[T]he present consolidation
plan uses boroughs in the city 'merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or
representation.' He is nonetheless the city's, not the borough's councilman." Dusch v. Davis, 387
U.S. 112, 115 (1967).
S"Goldblatt v. City of Dallas, 279 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
31Subsequently, the Dallas City Charter was amended to enlarge the city council from nine
to eleven members and to increase the voting districts from six to eight.
" Goldblatt v. City of Dallas, 279 F. Supp. 106, 107 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
3
' Id. at 110. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Goldblatt v. City of Dallas, 391 U.S. 360 (1968).
4
" Tex. Laws 1963, ch. 160, at 447. Article I of the Act is TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
970a (1963).
"TEX. REv,. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, S 3 (1963).
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territorial jurisdiction." Articles 1183-1187, enacted in 1913, permit
certain cities "situated along or upon navigable streams in this State" to
annex for special purposes land lying on both sides of such streams "for
a distance of twenty-five hundred feet from the thread of said stream"
and up to twenty air miles in length, beginning at the city's boundary."
The city has no power of taxation over the property within the specially
annexed territory unless the land is within the limits of the "general
city boundaries." 3"
Acting under articles 1183-1187, the City of Houston in 1913 annexed
specially a strip of land extending twenty air miles down the Houston
Ship Channel. In 1967, as part of an overall plan for this large strip of
land, the city sought to annex generally certain property lying within
the strip. A trial court granted a temporary injunction against the city,
holding that the property involved was not within the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction. The court of civil appeals reversed,' concluding that
since article III of the Municipal Annexation Act expressly saved articles
1183-1187 from repeal and further expressly stated that the provisions
of the Act were not to be applicable to any land held by a city under the
authority of articles 1183-1187, t such a city "is not limited to its extraterritorial jurisdiction in annexing for general purposes land which lies
within the specially annexed strip." '
An extremely complex series of events culminated in another annexation case, 3 involving the cities of Pasadena and Houston. For clarity, the
several ordinances of Pasadena and Houston involved will be labeled P-I,
-II, and -III, and H-I, -II, -III, -IV, and -V, respectively, in the order in
which passed by those cities, and a chronological outline will be used to
simplify the events leading to the litigation in question."
June 6, 1960: Pasadena passed P-I on first reading, annexing land
blocks A and B.
June 22, 1960: Houston passed H-I on first reading, annexing all
territory lying in Harris County not already in the city of Houston
or not validly incorporated in some other city.
December, 1960: (a) Pasadena passed P-I on second and final read36 Id. § 7.
7
" TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1183-87

(1963).
" Id. art. 1183. The purpose for allowing this special annexation authority is for the improvement of the navigation of the stream and the establishing and maintaining of wharves, docks, and
other similar facilities. Id. art. 1184.
"Id. art. 1185 (emphasis added).
40
City of Houston v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
4 "It is expressly provided that this Act shall not repeal or affect Article 1183 to Article 1187,
both inclusive, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, nor apply to any territories held by any
city or town under the provisions of said Articles or the laws of which said Articles were a codification." See the Historical Note following TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a (1963).
City of Houston v. Houston Endowment, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
"aCity of Pasadena v. State ex rel. City of Houston, 428 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),

42

error granted.
" The inclusion of a summary of the entire proceedings in each city is believed to be worthwhile to show the ingenuity with which a legal and political issue of this nature can be met. To
understand better the complicated series of events described here, it is suggested that the reader
consult the map, id. at 390.
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ing; (b) quo warranto proceedings were initiated against Pasadena to
oust that city from "certain extensive territory" covered by P-I.
May 18, 1962: Quo warranto proceedings were initiated against
Houston, attacking a number of Houston annexation ordinances,
including H-I.
June 22, 1962: Final judgments were rendered in both quo warranto
proceedings. Only land block A was held lawfully annexed to Pasadena by P-I. H-I, which had not been finally passed, was held valid
and sufficient to place land block B and an adjacent area, land block
C, within the annexation jurisdiction of the city of Houston.
December 5, 1962: While H-I was still pending, Houston passed
H-II on first reading, annexing a long, meandering ten-foot strip of
land beginning at Houston's boundary with land block B and, in
effect, enclosing all of land blocks B and C. The northern portion of
this long strip of land separated land block A, now a part of Pasadena, from land blocks B and C.
January 16, 1963: Final passage of H-II by Houston.
February 13, 1963: Second reading of H-I by Houston.
March 15, 1963: All annexation proceedings pending on or instituted
after this date were required by the Municipal Annexation Act to be
brought to completion within 90 days after the effective date of the
Act. H-I, annexing land blocks B and C was still pending at this
time, but H-II, annexing the long ten-foot strip around land blocks
B and C, had been finally passed.
August 23, 1963: Effective date of the Municipal Annexation Act.
November 20, 1963: Deadline for completing annexation proceedings pending on or instituted after March 15, 1963. Under the Municipal Annexation Act H-I became invalid.
December 16, 1964: Houston passed H-I on third reading.
August 18, 1965: Houston passed H-III, declaring its intention to
annex the northern portion of land block B and the northern and
eastern portions of land block C. Passage of this ordinance was specifically stated to be in compliance with the Municipal Annexation
Act should that Act be held valid. On the same day Houston passed
on first reading H-IV, annexing the same area as covered by H-III.
This ordinance was intended as a substitute measure for the proceedings begun by H-III if the Municipal Annexation Act was subsequently declared invalid.
August 20, 1965: Pasadena passed ordinances P-II and -III under
the authority of articles 1183-1187,45 annexing certain territory lying
"' See notes 37-43 supra, and accompanying text.
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along the Middle Bayou and within land blocks B and C. A portion
of this territory was identical with that covered by H-III and H-IV.
September 21, 1965: Houston passed H-V on first reading and thereby

purported to annex the area which in H-III it had declared its intention to annex in accordance with the Municipal Annexation Act.

October 6, 1965: Both H-IV (annexing the same area covered by
H-V, but without complying with the Municipal Annexation Act
with regard to notice and public hearings) and H-V were passed on

second reading.
October 14, 1965: The city of Houston brought suit to oust the city
of Pasadena from the territory along the Middle Bayou which Pasadena contended had been lawfully annexed by P-II and -III.
November 16, 1965: Both H-IV and H-V were passed on final
reading.
In its answer, Pasadena alleged that H-II, annexing the long ten-foot

strip of land, a portion of which separated the Pasadena boundary from
land blocks B and C, was unsuited to the economic needs of Houston, was
unreasonable and arbitrary in nature, and was passed solely to prevent
Pasadena from expanding."6
The trial court ruled in favor of Houston, and on appeal, the court of

civil appeals had no difficulty in finding precedent for approving the
annexation scheme employed by Houston in H-I. 7 Thus the city of
Pasadena could not extend its boundary into land blocks B and C because
the long ten-foot strip of land which had become a part of Houston upon

final passage of H-II prevented any portion of either of those blocks of
land from being adjacent to the city of Pasadena. However, the court
reversed and remanded for a determination of the validity of H-V.8

Disannexation.Taylor and others brought suit under the Municipal Annex-

ation Act to disannex 5 approximately 6.3 square miles of land from the
city of Fort Worth." A motion for summary judgment in favor of the

city was sustained by the trial court, but on appeal the court of civil
"City of Pasadena v. State ex rel. City of Houston, 428 S.W.2d 388, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968), error granted.
4"Id. at 397, citing, e.g., State ex rel. Pan Am. Prod. Co. v. Texas City, 157 Tex. 450, 303
S.W.2d 780 (1957); City of Houston v. State ex rel. City of West University Place, 142 Tex.
190, 176 S.W.2d 928 (1943), appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 711 (1944); Bute v. League City, 390
S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
" The city of Houston had failed to show affirmatively that H-III, declaring Houston's intention to annex the area subsequently covered by H-V, had been "published in its entirety" or
that a public hearing had been held in accordance with the Municipal Annexation Act. City of
Pasadena v. State ex rel. City of Houston, 428 S.W.2d 388, 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error
granted.
4 The disannexation provisions are found in TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 10 (1963).
S The plaintiffs alleged that the city, for a period of more than three years following annexation of the territory, had failed to provide the area with governmental and proprietary services
substantially equivalent to those furnished to other areas of the city having "characteristics of
topography, patterns of land utilization and population density" similar to that of the area to
be disannexed. TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 10A (1963). The city answered that such
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appeals reversed and remanded. " In City of Fort Worth v. Taylor52 the
Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the
trial court on grounds, not previously urged by the city, that the provisions of the Municipal Annexation Act were not available to residents of
the area in dispute. Noting that it was "not limited to the grounds stated
in the motion if there are other grounds which require the judgment as a

matter of law," 3 the court held that under its express terms, the Act

applies only "in cases where cities annex a particular area 'from and after

the effective date' of the Act."5 The area in question had been annexed
by the city of Fort Worth more than two months prior to passage of the
Act and more than six months before the effective date of August 23, 1963.
In another disannexation case,"s a court of civil appeals rejected the
contention of the city of Temple that since general obligation bonds had

been sold which would provide capital improvements to benefit the area
in question, disannexation could not be granted. Instead, the court held
that such improvements must be "special to the particular area,"" and
adopted a test based on "whether the improvements would have been

made regardless of whether the particular area was in or out of the municipality.""7 However, the judgment of the trial court granting disannexation was reversed and remanded on the ground that there was no evidence

to support the jury's finding that there were other areas of the city similar
in population density, topography, and land utilization which were receiv-

ing better services. All of the testimony on this issue concerned areas more
highly developed than that for which disannexation was being sought.

s

services had in fact been provided, and, in addition, that the plaintiffs were precluded by the Act
from relief because of the approval and sale by the city of general obligation bonds, the proceeds
of which were alleged to have been expended for capital improvements to serve the area in question.
The provision it relied on reads: "[T]he right of disannexation provided for in this Section shall
not be available to any particular annexed area which was lawfully within the city limits of a
city at the time of the approval or sale of any general obligation bonds of the city if proceeds
therefrom have been expended for capital improvements to serve such particular annexed area, so
long as any such bonds are outstanding." Id.
" Taylor v. City of Fort Worth, 421 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 427 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1968), holding that tle trial court was in error in granting a
summary judgment, since there was "a bona fide dispute as to whether the services required by
the statute [were] being furnished and whether the capital improvements (sewer system) [was]
to serve the area in question."
52427 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1968).
"Id. at 318.
"Id. at 319 (emphasis by the court). The opening sentence of the disannexation provisions is
in part as follows: "From and after the effective date of this Act, any city annexing a particular
area shall within three (3) years of the effective date of such annexation provide or cause to be
provided such area with governmental and proprietary services .... " TEx. RnV. Csv. STAT. ANN.
art. 970a, § 10A (1963). The problem arises with the word "annexing." If the legislature had intended to make the Act available to any areas annexed within a certain period prior to the effective date of the Act, it would have specifically so provided. As stated, it would seem that the
only possible interpretation is that given by the Texas Supreme Court.
5"City of Temple v. Fulton, 430 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. ir.e.
58 Id. at 742. The area in question in this case apparently was incidentally benefited by the
improvements.
" Id., citing Colorado cases in which the same test was used.
5
Ild. at 741.
All that we can infer from the record is that this 550-acre tract is principally
farm land and that its population is not more than 40 qualified voters. While this
evidence may be sufficient to show the population density, topography and utilization
of the 550-acre tract, the record is devoid of evidence of other areas in the City
of Temple where similar conditions exist. . . . [T]he Legislature has made very
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However, one may question whether disannexation may be effectively
precluded solely because there cannot be found within the city another
area with substantially similar population density, topography, and land
utilization. '
III.

REGULATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Three youthful members of a musical group calling itself "Sounds
Unlimited" were denied enrollment at a Dallas high school because they
wore "Beatle" haircuts."' Their parents brought an action in federal court
for injunctive relief, contending that the school regulation in question was
unconstitutional. There was ample evidence for the plaintiff that long
hair for young males was very much in vogue, especially among young
entertainers. "1 In defense of the regulation, the school principal testified
that such long hair styles had a disruptive effect upon normal activities
within the school."5 He cited occasions on which the long hair styles had
provoked challenges to fight-and in at least one instance had led to a
fight, had been the object of obscene language, and had drawn remarks
from other students as to which restroom was appropriate for those sporting
such hair styles. The district court denied injunctive relief,"3 and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the denial. In Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District " the court pointed out that under the constitution, " civil statutes,"
stringent requirements for disannexation. We have no doubt that they were
knowingly made. Disannexation freely or easily obtained would be disruptive of
municipal stability ....
Id. (emphasis added).
5a Does the italicized language, note 58 supra, satisfactorily answer the question?
60 As described by the mother of Stephen Webb, who was 18 years of age on September 7, 1966, 'Stephen's hair is over his ears, but one can see the lobe of his ear.
It is not over his collar, but is over his forehead and down to his eyebrows.' As
described by the mother of Paul Jarvis, 'his hair is about 1 inch over his ears and
about 1 V2 inches above his eyebrows.' Phillip Ferrell's hair, if hanging straight
forward, would come below his eyebrows, but is combed and turned to the side so
as to be a very short distance above his eyebrows. The hair extends down to the ear
lobe on the side and to the collar in the back. This hair style adopted by these
plaintiffs is in conformity with the so-called 'Beatle' type hair style.
Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545, 547 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
"xIn fact, one provision of the contract between the "Sounds Unlimited" and their business
manager specified: "It is further understood and agreed between Agent and Principle that Principle
and each member of Principles [sic] organization shall maintain their dress and personnal [sic]
appearance in conformity with accepted STANDARDS AND CUSTOMS OF ROCK & ROLL
GROUPS, COMBO'S [sic] AND BANDS including so called BEATLE TYPE HAIR STYLES."
Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 698 n.2 (5th Cir. 1968). The court noted that
the contract was not enforceable against the boys because they were minors.
6 "On one occasion a group of boys in his school had decided that a classmate's hair was
too long and that they were going to take the matter into their own hands and trim it themselves." Id. at 700. "Also one student admitted a fight had ensued over the fact that the football
,guys' at the school did not like long hair." Id. at 701.
5
" Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
64392 F.2d 697 (Sth Cir. 1968).
""A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and
rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make
suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools."
TEx. CONST. art. 7, § 1.
" TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2780 (1965). This article grants powers to boards of
trustees for independent school districts and provides in part: "Said trustees shall adopt such
rules, regulations and by-laws as they may deem proper; and the public free schools of such
independent district shall be under their control; and they shall have the exclusive power to
manage and govern said schools."
The principal of the school had established the rule in controversy under authority delegated

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

and judicial precedent" of Texas, "school boards are given a wide discretion in such matters" and may make "such rules and regulations as in their
judgment are necessary to maintain an 'efficient' system of schools, subject
to the limitation that there be no abuse of discretion, and that such regulations be not arbitrary, unreasonable or in violation of law." ' In view of
the evidence indicating that the long hair styles had a disruptive effect in
the school, the court was unable to say "that the requirement that appellants trim their hair as a prerequisite to enrollment [was] arbitrary,
unreasonable or an abuse of discretion."" The majority appeared to treat
the case as one involving the first amendment freedom of expression, which
may be infringed by the state only if there are compelling reasons to do so."
The judges found that the compelling reason here was obviously to prevent
interference with the state's interest in providing "the best education
possible for its people."'" They recognized the right of the boys to engage
in the entertainment business "free from unreasonable governmental
interference,"'" but pointed out that many performers wear wigs and
hairpieces for public appearances. Thus the boys' business activity was

not, as a practical matter, eliminated by the school rules and regulations. 3
In dissent, Judge Tuttle took issue with the majority's approach to the
problem:
These boys were not barred from school because of any actions carried out by
them which were of themselves a disturbance of the peace. They were barred
because it was anticipated, by reason of previous experiences, that their fellow
students in some instances would do things that would disrupt the serenity
or calm of the school. It is these acts that should be prohibited, not the
expressions of individuality by the suspended students. 4

Believing the case should be resolved by applying the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, he concluded that the regulation created "an utterly unreasonable classification of students by the state in
granting or denying the right of a public education."'"
The Ferrell decision was relied upon by another school board in a case
involving the validity of its order that "students who married would be
suspended for three weeks and could reapply for attendance at school only
after the expiration of three weeks." 7 The Ferrell situation was easily
to him by the school board. When the boys consulted the Superintendent, they were told that
there was no rule concerning the length of a boy's hair and that the principal of each school set
his own rules and regulations in this regard. Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545,
547 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
"See Wilson v. Abilene Ind. School Dist., 190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), error
ref. w.o.m.
68 Id. at 412, quoted by the court of appeals in the instant case at 392 F.2d at 702.
"aFerrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1968).
"°Compare the dissenting Judge's approach, text 4ccompanying note 75 infra.
"1Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 1968).
12 Id. at 704.
7
3 Id.
4
1 1d. at 706.
'Id.
at 705. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, but Justice
Douglas dissented, seeing the situation as one which ssould exist only in "a nation bent on turning
out robots." Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
"'Carrollton-Farmers Branch Ind. School Dist. v. Knight, 418 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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distinguishable, and a Texas court of civil appeals upheld the trial court in
granting a temporary injunction against enforcement of the order against
two students who had married. The court concluded that the weight of
authority in Texas and the United States supported the view that marriage
alone is not a proper ground for suspending a student from school for
scholastic purposes only." Specifically, the court noted that the evidence
established that attendance at school by the married couple had not caused
tturmoil, unrest and upheaval against education by fellow students." 8
The Fort Worth Independent School District requires the parents of all
junior and senior high school students to sign a Supplementary Application
for Enrollment, certifying that the student is not presently a member of a
fraternity, sorority, or secret society prohibited by article 301d of the
penal statutes"9 and that the student will not "join nor participate in any
way in the activities of such a club or organization."" A group of parents
brought a class action seeking a declaratory judgment that article 301d
and the supplementary application form are unconstitutional, and asking
that the school district be enjoined from prohibiting the attendance of
students whose parents had not signed the required form."'
The initial procedural barrier which the applicants faced presented some
interesting questions concerning the importance of one's interest in attending public schools. In the recent case of City of Fort Worth v. Craiks5 the
Supreme Court of Texas reiterated the rule that a civil court sitting in
equity can only interfere with the enforcement of criminal statutes when
vested property rights are threatened with irreparable injury. In the instant
case the court of civil appeals relied on Craik in affirming the trial court's
dismissal for want of jurisdiction, feeling compelled to leave the determination of the constitutionality of the penal statute and the regulation to
courts exercising criminal jurisdiction."3 Obviously, this result required a
finding that either (1) there was no irreparable injury, or (2) public
77 Id. at 542. The court cited the following as authority for its position: Board of Educ. v.
Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); McLeod v. State ex Tel. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468,
122 So. 737 (1929); Anderson v. Canyon Ind. School Dist., 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967); Alvin Ind. School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); TEx. ATr'Y
GEN. Op. No. 0-4965 (1942).
"'Carrollton-Farmers Branch Ind. School Dist. v. Knight, 418 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
7 TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 301d (1952). Section 4 of the statute requires suspension or
expulsion of students who join or remain in a prohibited organization.
"Passel v. Fort Worth Ind. School Dist., 429 S.W.2d 917, 919 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
error granted.

81 Id.
82411 S.W.2d 541

(Tex. 1967).
Discussing the constitutional issue, the court cited a civil appeals decision, Wilson v. Abilene
Independent School Dist., 190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), error ref. w.o.m. (where the
students were required as a prerequisite to participating in certain school activities to sign a pledge
that they would not participate in any of the prohibited organizations); legal encyclopedias, 47
AM. JuR. Schools § 169 (1943), 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 499 (1952); annotations
at 134 A.L.R. 1274 (1941), 27 A.L.R. 1074 (1923); and decisions from other states, Robinson
v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d 278, 53 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1966), Steele
v. Sexton, 253 Mich. 32, 234 N.W. 436 (1931), as authority supporting the constitutionality of
such legislation. The court expressed "concern" over the issue of whether the statute and the regulation requiring completion of the supplementary application form invaded "the right of parental
control over their children." Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School Dist., 429 S.W.2d 917, 925
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error granted.
8s
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school attendance is not a vested property right. The court seemed to find
that there was no irreparable injury, stating:
Even if we assume that the rights of appellants to attend the public schools
are both civil rights as well as property rights, we are unable to see how those
rights have been impinged in this case. The students involved here have not
been denied the right to attend public schools. On the contrary, they have
been accorded the same rights, privileges and immunities as all other
students . ...

This analysis appears to beg the question. If his parents obey the regulation a student may attend school and there will be no irreparable
injury. However, the crucial issue is whether, if a student's parents refuse
to obey the regulation, the resulting refusal to enroll him is an irreparable
injury. If, as the court assumed, public school attendance is a right, its
denial surely constitutes an irreparable injury.
If public school attendance is not a right, or more specifically, a vested
property right, then the Craik rule prohibits a civil court from deciding
on the constitutionality of the statute. The Craik rule, however, appears
to be unduly restrictive, especially in view of the broad language of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act adopted in Texas in 1943." The
purpose underlying that Act seemingly is to allow determinations of constitutionality when the interest affected by the statute is of such great
importance to the individual as to require the careful protection of the
courts. There can be no doubt that the opportunity to obtain an education,
whether considered a right or a privilege," deserves the most jealous protection of the law. The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ of error
in this case, and, hopefully it will give the Texas civil courts the authority
to pass on the constitutionality of the penal statute involved either by
modifying the present standard to include interests other than vested
property rights, or by finding that the interest in a public school education
falls within a reasonable interpretation of the existing standard.
If the supreme court is unwilling to adopt this approach, perhaps the
judgment of the court of civil appeals could be reversed on another basis.
No decision need be made on the constitutionality of the penal statute in
order to find that the regulation requiring completion of the supplementary
application form as a condition for enrollment is unconstitutional. Even
" Passel v. Fort Worth Ind. School Dist., 429 S.W.2d 917, 924-25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
error granted.
s Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare

rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could
be claimed. . . . Any person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are
affected by a Statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, Statute,
ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other
legal relations thereunder.
TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1, SS 1, 2 (1965).
In City of Amarillo v. Griggs Southwest Mortuary, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966), error ref. n.r.e., the court held that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act did not
change the rules with regard to the construction of penal statutes by courts of equity. Reliance
was placed on the phrase "within their respective jurisdictions," included above.
so Note the phrase "rights, status, or other legal relations" employed in the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, note 85 supra.
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under the broad grant of authority possessed by the Texas school boards,
to deny a student enrollment in the public schools solely because his
parents refuse to sign the form-an act over which the student himself
has virtually no control-seems to establish an arbitrary classification
having no reasonable relationship to the state's interest in providing an
effective and efficient school system.
IV.

POLICE POWER

A Dallas ordinance established a nine-member Motion Picture Classification Board with authority to classify films as either "suitable for young
persons" or "*not suitable for young persons."8 Constitutionally adequate
procedural safeguards, including a requirement that the Board assume the
burden of seeking judicial review of its determinations in cases of nonacceptance by the exhibitor, were spelled out in detail by the ordinance."
No film classified "not suitable for young persons" could be exhibited
unless the classification was clearly stated in all advertisements of the film
by the exhibitor and was "posted prominently in front of the theatre in
which such film" was being exhibited. " Exhibitors were prohibited from
knowingly selling or giving to a young person"0 a ticket to such a film 1
or knowingly permitting a young person to view such a film. 2 The
ordinance specified that films "not suitable for young persons" were those
"describing or portraying brutality, criminal violence or depravity in such
a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or
encourage crime or delinquency on the part of young persons"" and those
"describing or portraying nudity beyond the customary limits of candor
in the community, or sexual promiscuity or extramarital or abnormal
sexual relations in such a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board,
" DALLAS, TEX., REV. CODE OF CIV. & CRIM. ORDINANCES ch. 46A (1960). See Appendix
to Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 691-703 (1968). Hereafter, references
to the ordinance will be to its section number and to the page of the Appendix to the Supreme
Court opinion on which that section of the ordinance may be found.
8 See § 46A-3, 390 U.S. at 694-95 (classification procedure); § 46A-7, 390 U.S. at 698-702
(procedure for judicial review).
For a discussion of what procedural safeguards are required, see Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965), where the Court said:
[A] noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor
avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards
designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving
that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. . . . Second, while
the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censor's determination whether a film constitutes protected expression . . . . [T]he exhibitor must
be assured, by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will,
within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain
showing the film.
Id. at 58-59. In the Dallas case, the Supreme Court specifically held that the procedural requirements of the Dallas ordinance met the standard established in Freedman. See Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690-91 n.22 (1968).
8' Sections 46A-4(a) (2), (3), 390 U.S. at 695-96.
go,, 'Young person' means any person who has not attained his sixteenth birthday." Section
46A-1 (d), 390 U.S. at 691.
0'See § 46A-4(a) (4), 390 U.S. at 696.
" See § 46A-4(a) (5), 390 U.S. at 696.
2Section 46A-l (f) (I), 390 U.S. at 691-92.
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likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the
part of young persons or to appeal to their prurient interest.""4
A film entitled Viva Maria was classified by the Board as "not suitable
for young persons," and the classification was upheld on judicial review in
a county court. The court of civil appeals affirmed. 5 In Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. City of Dallas6 the United States Supreme Court reversed the
court of civil appeals. Although it specifically recognized that "a State
may regulate the dissemination to juveniles of, and their access to, material
objectionable as to them . . .which a State clearly could not regulate as to
adults,"9 the Court found that in the Dallas ordinance there were no
"narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officials to
follow." 9 Therefore, the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. 9
Anyone who may be perplexed as to what the Supreme Court might
consider "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards" will find no
guidance from the Court's opinion in the Dallas case."' However, on the
same day that this case was decided, the Court in Ginsberg v. New York"°1
upheld a New York statute prohibiting the knowing sale to minors of
94Section 46A-l (f) (2), 390 U.S. at 692. Subsection (f) also provides:
A film shall be considered 'likely to incite or encourage' crime, delinquency or sexual
promiscuity on the part of young persons, if, in the judgment of the Board, there
is a substantial probability that it will create the impression on young persons that
such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly accepted. A film shall be considered as appealing to 'prurient interest' of
young persons, if in the judgment of the Board, its calculated or dominant effect
on young persons is substantially to arouse sexual desire.
Id. at 692.
"aInterstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 402 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error ref.
n.r.e. For comment on the decision of the court of civil appeals, see Webster & FitzGerald, MunicipalCorporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 221, 224-26 (1967).
9390 U.S. 676 (1968).
97
Id. at 690, citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), decided on the same day as
the Dallas case and discussed at notes 101-02 infra, and accompanying text.
98Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968). Citing examples of
vagueness in the Dallas ordinance, the Court stated:
The term 'sexual promiscuity' is not there defined and was not interpreted in the
state courts. It could extend, depending upon one's moral judgment, from the obvious to any sexual contacts outside a marital relationship. The determinative manner
of the 'describing or portraying' of the subjects covered by the ordinance . . .
including 'sexual promiscuity' is defined as 'such a manner as to be, in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity
on the part of young persons.' A film is so 'likely to incite or encourage crime,
delinquency or sexual promiscuity if, in the judgment of the Board, there is a substantial probability that it will create the impression on young persons that such
conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly
accepted.' It might be excessive literalism to insist, as do appellants, that because
those last six adjectives are stated in the disjunctive, they represent separate and
alternative subtle determinations the Board is to make, any of which results in a not
suitable classification. Nonetheless, '[wihat may be to one viewer the glorification
of an idea as being "desirable, acceptable, or proper" may to the notions of another
be entirely devoid of such a teaching. The only limits [sic] on the censor's discretion is
his understanding of what is included in the term "desirable, acceptable, or proper."
This is nothing less than a roving commission .
Id. at 687-88.
" Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, concurred in the result, but on the ground that
obscene materials are protected under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
In fact, in this case, Justices Douglas and Black would have affirmed under the majority's test,
believing with Justice Harlan, who dissented, that the Dallas ordinance was "sufficiently precise
and discriminating for modern man to apply intelligently." Id. at 704 (Douglas, J., concurring).
"'Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, specifically declined to lay down guidelines,
stating: "It is not our province to draft legislation." Id. at 690.
'1390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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material which is "harmful to minors" and defining in much more precise
language than the Dallas movie ordinance the types of materials which
fall within the prohibition.'" Apparently taking its cue from the decisions
in both of these cases, the Dallas City Council on June 10, 1968, passed
an ordinance' reenacting most of the earlier movie classification ordinance,
4°
but including detailed definitions of such terms as "abnormal sexual acts,""3

"nudity,' 0 5 "sexual conduct, '. and "sexual promiscuity,""... and in
several instances employing language almost identical to that used in the
New York statute at issue in the Ginsberg case.'0 '
A civil appeals case'' involved an ordinance of the city of Georgetown,
Texas, limiting the size of underground gasoline storage tanks at retail
service stations within the city to a capacity of 2,000 gallons and limiting
the size of trucks delivering gasoline to retail stations to a capacity of
1,400 gallons. In accordance with the ordinance, the custom was for gasoline to be transported into and through Georgetown in 8,000-gallon
trucks and pumped into large overhead storage tanks at bulk plants for
later delivery by smaller trucks to retail stations. Humble Oil and Refining
Company was refused a permit for construction of a service station in
Georgetown because the plans included one underground storage tank
with an 8,000-gallon capacity and another with a 6,000-gallon capacity.
Humble challenged both the 2,000-gallon and the 1,400-gallon limitations
imposed by the ordinance.
The trial court held the underground storage limitation unconstitutional
and void and granted mandamus requiring the city to issue a building
permit for the proposed service station; however, it upheld the delivery
truck requirement of the ordinance. On appeal by both parties, the court
of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's determination as to the underground tank limitation but held that the gasoline delivery truck provision
was also unconstitutional."'
'0'The statute defines such terms as "nudity, .... sexual conduct," "sexual excitement," and
"sado-masochistic abuse," id. at 645-46, and provides:
'Harmful to minors' means that quality of any description or representation, in
whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic
abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult

community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
Id. at 646. Compare the Supreme Court's statement of the elements of obscenity in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The significant terms are the same, but the New York statute
has made them specially applicable to minors.
' Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 12169, June 10, 1968, repealing DALLAS, TEx., REV. CODE OF
CIv. & CRIM. ORDINANCES ch. 46A (1960), and substituting a new chapter.
;04Id. § 46A-1 (a) (1).
'5 Id. § 46A-1 (a) (16).
0
' 71 Id. § 46A-1 (a) (19).
0 Id. § 46A-1 (a) (20).
" The definitions of nudity and sexual conduct, for example, appear to draw language directly
from the New York statute. In addition, in defining "not suitable for young persons," the new
ordinance (Id. § 46A-1 (a) (15)) adopts the three elements used in the New York statute for the
definition of "harmful to minors." See note 102 supra. What could be one significant departure
from the New York language is the substitution by the Dallas ordinance of the word "predominantly" for "utterly" in requiring that the film be "predominantly without redeeming social importance for young persons."
I0' Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. City of Georgetown, 428 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).

1I0 Id.
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Examining the delivery truck restriction first, the court expressly
recognized the burden upon Humble to show that there was "no reasonable
basis for the classes created by the ordinance." ' ..1 The court then emphasized that the provision in question restricted only the activity of delivering or discharging gasoline from the truck into a service station storage
tank, but in no way regulated the use of Georgetown streets by trucks
with a greater capacity. Thus, the city's argument that an accident involving the larger trucks would result in more gasoline being spilled and would
"cause a bigger fire than a smaller transport truck carrying fewer gallons
of gasoline" was of no merit.112 Relying upon expert testimony to the
effect that "the safest procedure that can be followed in handling inflammable liquids such as gasoline is to handle it the minimum number of
times, .1. the court stressed the fact that delivery by the smaller trucks
would involve many more instances of connecting and disconnecting
discharge lines than delivery by large transports;11 thus, under the ordinance gasoline introduced into Georgetown to be sold from retail service
stations would be subject to increased exposure to human error.1 ' The
court further pointed out that the "larger transports are equipped with
safety devices not present on the smaller vehicles providing airtight connection between the truck and the underground tank to prevent escape
of vapor" ' and that it is this vapor which creates the chief danger of
fire rather than the gasoline itself. Finally, the court cited a decision by
the Texas court of criminal appeals holding void a similar ordinance of the
city of Ballinger,11' and noting that the Georgetown ordinance also made
violations a penal offense, stated that "[i]n following the policy that the
proper administration of justice demands that harmony exist in the construction of statutes criminal in their nature, it is our duty . . . to follow
the ruling of the Court of Criminal Appeals. 1 8
Turning to the underground storage tank provision of the ordinance,
the court again relied on expert testimony, which it said "clearly established that the greatest danger of fire is present when gasoline is being
' 9 so that the
transferred from the transport to the underground storage, 11
ordinance, by increasing the number of instances of transfer from truck to
storage tank, actually increased "the number of occasions when the
greatest fire hazard is presented."' 20 The court also noted that the "larger
tanks have thicker walls and are less likely to acquire leaks by corrosion
or electrolysis. 1.1 Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the
Id. at 407.
Id.at 409.
1 3
ld. at 411.
114

Id.

115Id.
16 Id. at 412.
11 Ex Parte Rodgers, 371 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
11 Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. City of Georgetown, 428 S.W.2d 405, 411-12 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968).
119Id. at 413.

120Id.
121Id.
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storage tank provision of the Georgetown ordinance was unconstitutional
and void was approved.
In another interesting case involving the exercise of a city's police
power, the city of Seagoville attempted to enforce a 1955 ordinance
requiring a $10 license fee for the operation of a pool hall. Having failed
to comply with the ordinance, Young had been told to close his hall. Upon
his refusal, he was arrested and convicted in corporation court under a
penal provision of the ordinance. While his appeal was pending, Young
sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance but was denied relief in
the trial court. On appeal, a court of civil appeals declared that the
ordinance in question was void ab initio since at the time of its enactment,
Texas civil and criminal statutes absolutely prohibited the operation of
pool halls in the state. ' The subsequent repeal of these statutes in 1963
did not revive the ordinance; thus its enforcement was enjoined. On the
issue of the court's power to enjoin enforcement of a penal measure, the
court relied upon the "vested property right" standard and concluded:
"We are of the opinion that the City is attempting to enforce a void
ordinance and in doing so harms appellant's existing property rights."' '
As a concluding note, it seems appropriate to compare the result reached
inthe last two cases with the result reached when parents sought a determination that their children could enroll in the Fort Worth public schools
without the parents' certification that their children did not belong to nor
plan to participate in the activities of certain organizations. 4 In all three
cases, a civil court was asked to declare invalid legislation containing penal
sanctions. In all three, the court was faced with the initial question of
whether enforcement of the legislation worked an irreparable injury to
vested property rights.' Although the decisions in the service station and
pool hall cases appear to be beyond question, consider the possibility that in
Texas a person's interest in obtaining an education does not receive the
same respect accorded the interests protected by those decisions.

122

Young v. City of Seagoville, 421 S.W.2d 485

(Tex. Civ. App. 1967).

" 'Id. at 488.
"Passel
v. Fort Worth Independent School Dist., 429 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
error granted. See the discussion of the school cases in Section III of this Article.
"2'In Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. City of Georgetown, 428 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968),
the court of civil appeals did not discuss the issue in its opinion, but its establishment in the trial
court would seem to be a prerequisite to jurisdiction.

